







English Edition 1990-91 
25 September 1990 A3-223/90/B 
REPORT 
of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs 
and Industrial Policy 
on Economic and Monetary Union 
Rapporteur: Mr F. HERMAN 
* 
* * 
- PART B: Explanatory statement -
Opinion of the Committee on Budgets 
DOC_EN\D0\95406 PE 140.147/fin./B 
Or. Fr. 
A Senes Reports - B senes Mot1ons for Resolutions, Oral Ouest1ons, Wntten Declarations, etc - C Senes Documents rece1ved from other lnst1tut1ons (e g Consultations) 
ConsultatiOn procedure requ1nng a s1ngle read1ng 
Cooperation procedure (f1rst read1ng) 
Cooperat1on procedure (second readmg) wh1ch requ1res the votes of the maJonty of the Members 
of Parliament 
Parliamentary assent wh1ch requ1res the votes of the maJonty of the current Members of Parl1a· 
ment 
CONTENTS 
B. EXPLANATORY STATEMENT 14 
Opinion of the Committee on Budgets .................................. 42 




In its resolution of 23 November 1989, Parliament asked to participate in the 
intergovernmental conference on monetary union to be convened at the end of 
1990. 
Whatever the practical arrangements governing this involvement, and assuming 
the Council does not turn down the request, Parliament must be prepared. The 
Committee on Institutional Affairs has been authorized to draw up a report on 
this matter in line with the resolution of 23 November 1989, i.e. one not 
restricted solely to the monetary aspect. Mr Martin has been named 
rapporteur, and in the working document he tabled to 1 aunch the debate he 
refers to the Franz report as a reflection of Parliament's views on monetary 
integration. Adopted during the 1 ast parliamentary term, the report was 
intended to provide the committee of experts chaired by Mr Delors with 
Parliament's views on monetary union. 
The Delors report has now appeared and events have moved on apace. Much has 
changed in a short time, not least attitudes towards monetary union. 
That is why the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and Industria 1 
Policy requested authorization to draw up a report which will be annexed to 
that by Mr Martin and which will cover only the treaty amendments required to 
transform the Community into an economic and monetary union. 
The first chapter wi 11 attempt to introduce and justify these amendments on 
the basis of the following questions: 
is economic and monetary union inevitable? 
how far should monetary union go? 
can one conceive of economic union without monetary union and vice-versa? 
do the Treaties need to be amended? 
what are the benefits of monetary union? 
can one have a stable currency without an independent central bank? 
how can the independence of a central bank be guaranteed? 
one central bank or a European system of central banks? 
On the basis of the answers to these questions, a second chapter sets out 27 
draft articles to be incorporated in the Treaty. 
While the Commission document on economic and monetary union (SEC(90) 1654, 
21 August 1990) essentially follows the line of the Delors report, the points 
on which it diverges from it correspond very closely to the positions adopted 
by Parliament in its interim report of 16 May 1990 (the Herman report). 
It is therefore to Parliament's credit that it should have clearly expressed 
its viewpoint at a moment when the Commission had not yet finally defined its 
own position. 
The points of cl ear agreement between the Commission and Parliament are as 
follows: 
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Like Parliament, the Commission insists on the ultimate goal of a single 
currency, rather than the system of permanently fixed exchange rates whi eh 
corresponds to the minimalist view of monetary union. 
The Commissions considers, for similar reasons to those invoked by Parliament, 
that the transitional period corresponding to the second stage should be as 
short as possible, since this stage entails maximum constraint together with 
minimal advantages. 
The Commission agrees with Parliament that it is not possible to place severe 
restrictions on the fiscal and budgetary sovereignty of the Member States by 
dictating rigid rules of the type proposed in the Delors report. Indeed, it 
goes further than Parliament in the definition of limits in this respect. 
The Commission follows Parliament in proposing that the ECU should be 
explicitly designated as the future single currency of the union and that it 
should henceforth be defined as such in the Treaties, and in proposing that 
the use and possession of ECUs should be promoted even before the final stage 
of economic and monetary union. 
Like Parliament, the Commission considers it vital to reinforce economic union 
prior to monetary union or at least concurrently with it. Such a 
reinforcement implies further development of the common policies and an 
increase in budgetary and financial resources with a view to enhancing 
economic and social cohesion in the Community. On this aspect, the Commission 
is more concrete and explicit than Parliament; on the other hand, it does not 
venture as far as Parliament with regard to the coordination of conjunctural 
policies. 
The Commission follows Parliament in stressing the need for cooperation 
between the monetary authority and the Community authority responsible for 
economic policy in the determination of exchange rate policy vis-a-vis third 
country currencies; the Delors report, in contrast, proposes that this should 
be the responsibility of the Central Bank. 
The Commission agrees with Parliament in stressing, more than the Delors 
report does, the need for the monetary authority to support the objectives of 
economic po 1 icy as defined by the Community's po 1 it i ea 1 authorities wh i 1 e 
maintaining monetary stability. In this respect, there is a small divergence 
between the Commission and Parliament insofar as Parliament refers to the 
'autonomy', rather than the 'independence', of the Central Bank. 
On the subject of the participation of certain Member States, the Commission 
accepts that a degree of flexibility could be applied as regards the deadline 
for full involvement of certain Member States in all the arrangements of the 
final stage. This could entail specific transitional arrangements. This 
amounts to a restatement of the position affirmed by Parliament in paragraph 
14 of the first part of the interim report of 16 May 1990. 
Finally, the Commission rejects, with as much firmness as Parliament, the 
notions of monetary integration via 'freely competing currencies' or the 
introduction of a thirteenth currency as legal tender throughout the 
Community. 
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On a number of other points, however, the Commission's positions clearly 
diverge from those of Parliament. This applies, predictably enough, to the 
question of the role and powers of Parliament in the field of monetary policy. 
Wherever Parliament demands powers of eo-decision or, at least, the existence 
of an assent procedure or non-objection procedure on the basis of a qualified 
majority vote, the Commission would confine it to a purely consultative role. 
This applies to the following: 
appointment of the president of the European system of central banks; 
appointment of the board of directors of the European system of central 
banks; 
definition of the multiannual guidelines; 
allocation of specific forms of financial support; 
harmonization of conjunctural policies; 
adoption of the organic law defining the arrangements for implementation of 
the new provisions of the Treaties concerning economic and monetary union 
and adoption of the statutes of the European system of central banks. 
The Commission attributes to the European Council a role that Parliament would 
prefer to see exercised by the Counci 1 of Economic and Finance Ministers or 
the General Affairs Council. 
The Commission appears not to have adopted Parliament's suggestion of dividing 
the legislation concerning economic and monetary union into the essential 
pri nci pl es, to be included in the Treaties, and the concrete arrangements, 
including the statutes of the European system of central banks, which could be 
dealt with in an organic law. This is because the Commission wishes the 
statutes of the federal bank to be annexed to the Treaty. On this basis, 
however, it would only be possible to amend them by the cumbersome procedure 
defined in Article 236. 
On the matter of the addition a 1 tasks of the centra 1 bank, Parliament goes 
further than the Commission, approximating to the positions of the Delors 
report, especially with regard to the supervision of credit institutions. 
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Chapter I : General considerations 
I. THE INEVITABILITY OF MONETARY UNION 
The establishment of economic and monetary union has been a Community 
objective since 1969. This has since been restated on numerous occasions1 
and incorporated in the Treaty of Rome by the Single Act ratified in 19872 • 
More recently, the Hanover, Madrid and Strasbourg European Councils have 
taken more explicit and practical steps to achieve this objective. 
Today, therefore, an undertaking which has been formally given and 
repeated cannot unilaterally be called into question. By the same token, 
its implementation could not be postponed indefinitely on the pretext of 
disagreement with the pract i ea 1 arrangements or the time tab 1 e. Such an 
attitude, particularly if not accompanied by constructive and serious 
alternative proposals, could legitimately be interpreted as a refusal to 
implement the undertakings given in the Treaty and, as such, trigger the 
break-up of the Community. 
Such a refusal, likely to be condemned by the Court of Justice as a breach 
of Community law, could not, in any case, nullify the determination of a 
significant majority of the Member States to implement amongst themselves 
1 Final communique of the conference of Heads of State or Government held in 
The Hague in December 1969. 
Werner Report (1970) : Report to the Council and Commission on the 
attainment by stages of economic and monetary union in the Community. 
Council Resolution of 22 March 1971 on the attainment by stages of economic 
and monetary union in the Community. 
Resolution of the Council and Representatives of the Governments of the 
Member States of 21 March 1972 on the implementation of the Resolution of 
22 March 1971 on the attainment by stages of economic and monetary union in 
the Community. 
Final communique of the conference of Heads of State or Government of 
Member States and future members of the European Communities (Paris, 
19 to 21 October 1972). 
Communication from the Commission to the Council on the progress achieved 
during the first stage of economic and monetary union, the division of 
powers and responsibilities among the institutions of the Community and the 
Member States needed for the smooth functioning of economic and monetary 
union and the measures to be taken during the second stage of that union 
(April 1973). 
Conclusions of the Presidency of the European Council (Brussels, 5 and 6 
December 1977). 
Report of the Commission Study Group 'Economic and Monetary Union 1980' 
(March 1975). 
2 Article 102a 
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the treaty establishing this union. The possibility of phased monetary 
integration if not all the Member States could accept monetary union at the 
same time would quite a different matter, and will be considered later. 
II.THE NEED FOR A MONETARY UNION WITH A SINGLE CURRENCY 
According to the DELORS report, economic union has four basic components: 
- the single market within which persons, goods, services and capital move 
freely; 
-a competition policy and other measures to strengthen market mechanisms 
and increase their transparency; 
-common policies to restructure industry, foster regional development and 
reduce regional and social disparities; 
-the coordination of macroeconomic policy including binding budgetary 
rules. 
Citing in its turn the 1970 WERNER report, the same report states that 
monetary union implies that three conditions must be met: 
the guarantee of the full and irreversible convertibility of currencies; 
- full freedom of capital movements and the complete integration of banking 
and other financial markets; 
-the elimination of margins of fluctuation and the permanent fixing of 
exchange rates. 
Meeting these three conditions, and particularly the third, implies a 
degree of convergence in the economic and monetary policies of the 12 
Member States which appears Utopian without a transfer of significant 
national powers to a Community economic and monetary authority. Once this 
transfer has been or can be achieved, a single currency should be 
introduced immediately. As we will see later, the benefits of monetary 
union are maximized when it is pushed to its logical conclusion, i.e. 
through the imposition of a single currency. 
Conversely, and perhaps paradoxically, the constraints on national 
budgetary and fiscal policies are much tighter when irrevocably fixed 
exchange rates have to be maintained between 12 currencies in an area 
where capital movements are completely unrestricted. If, however, there 
is on 1 y one single currency and, therefore, a common poo 1 of currency 
reserves, the constraints imposed by the need to keep Member States' 
balance of payments in equilibrium disappear. This increases governments' 
room for manoeuvre in respect of economic policy. They can maintain growth 
po 1 i c i es wh i eh are not current 1 y feas i b 1 e under the EMS. They may no 
longer raise interest rates, thus putting a brake on investment, in order 
to stop capital outflows or reduce imports. 
The fact that governments may no 1 onger print money in order to finance 
public account deficits restores to the capital markets the responsibility 
of carrying out the transfers of savings forced on national authorities who 
are unable to balance their budgets. Under this market mechanism, the 
Member States will regain a freedom of action whose abuse may be penalized 
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by an increase in the cost of borrowing money. However, the po 1 it i ea 11 y 
thorny problem for a Community authority of imposing fiscal and budgetary 
standards on states jealously protective of their sovereignty in these 
areas a 1 so disappears. In a single-currency European monetary union the 
Member States would have greater budgetary freedom than that enjoyed by the 
Lander in Germany or the individual states in the United States since the 
Community budget represents only a tiny fraction of national budgets. 
* 
* * 
Ill. THE NEED FOR ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION 
No economic union is poss i b 1 e without monetary union 
sustainable monetary union without a certain degree of 
without adequate convergence in national economic 
control of an effective Community authority. 
and there can be no 
economic union, i.e. 
policies under the 
It is illusory to seek to create a large internal market in which the four 
freedoms of movement provided for in the Treaty would be sustained but in 
wh i eh 12 nation a 1 currencies dependent on 12 autonomous monetary 
authorities would co-exist. 
The full liberalization of capital movements and financial services will 
exert destabi 1 i zi ng pressures on the European Monetary System unless the 
cohesion of the system is very rapidly strengthened, in particular by 
securing greater convergence among economic policies. 
The destabi 1 i zat ion of the EMS and the return to fluctuating exchange 
rates would 1 ead to the recompartmenta 1 izat ion of the i nterna 1 market, 
capital movements being affected first. 
In this connection, Parliament endorses the conclusions of the Padoa 
Schioppa and Delors reports and rejects the so-called topping-off theory 
which makes provision for monetary union only after the completion of 
economic union. The two processes are mutually reinforcing, and should be 
developed in parallel. 
IV. THE NEED FOR AMENDMENT OF THE TREATIES 
Can economic union and monetary union be a eh i eved without amending the 
Treaties and without strengthening Community institutions? The categorical 
answer is no! 
A. Economic union and economic policy convergence 
The Council Decision of 18 February 1974 on the achievement of a high 
degree of economic policy convergence laid down a variety of obligations 
and coordination procedures. 
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They have had 1 ittl e impact because they have not been adequately 
applied, the Member States failing to reach agreement on policy 
objectives and instruments. It will most 1 i kel y always be so whilst 
free elections continue to produce different results in individual 
countries. 
The Commission recent 1 y proposed a revision of the 197 4 decision on 
convergence. The new procedure would introduce a mul t il atera 1 
monitoring process on the basis of agreed indicators. Disparities 
between the performances achieved and the objectives jointly set would 
prompt consultations and recommendations with a view to securing the 
necessary corrections in national policies. 
Parliament is not convinced that these marginal improvements would bring 
about the desired convergence given the problems involved and the drawn-
out nature of the decision-making process in the Council. 
This is why, in the spirit of the new Article 102a, there is a need to 
incorporate in the EEC Treaty an institutional mechanism with 
strengthened, democratically supervised powers. 
Granting the Commission the power to take economic po 1 icy decisions 
with the assent of the Council acting on a majority vote in accordance 
with a procedure modelled on the ECSC Treaty, but with the difference 
that Parliament's assent would also be required, could offer a more 
worthwhile improvement at least with regard to the basic guidelines. 
Other, less important, decisions could be taken by the Commission in 
collaboration with the Economic Policy Committee using the management 
committee procedure, but with a requirement to report to Parliament. 
This Commission power should essentially cover the macroeconomic 
analysis of current trends and economic growth with their implications 
for savings, consumption, investment and the Community's balance of 
payments, at the same time observing the subsidiarity principle and 
delegating to the Member States the widest possible implementing powers. 
B. The need to amend the monetary provisions of the Treaties 
The European Monetary System (EMS) was set up by a European Counc i 1 
resolution (5 December 1978) followed by a Council decision and an 
agreement among the participating central banks. 
Not later than two years after the entry into force of the system the 
new arrangements and the existing institutions should have been brought 
together to form a European Monetary Fund. This second, i nst i tut ion a 1 
phase, which, according to the agreed timetable, should have been 
completed in March 1981, has never got off the ground. 
This raises the following question: if, in 1979, it was thought 
possible to set up a European Monetary Fund by means of a simple 
Council decision, admittedly one based on Article 235 of the EEC 
Treaty, why, ten years later, is there a need to amend the Treaties in 
order to achieve a similar objective? 
The answer is for several reasons. 
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The establishment of the European Monetary Fund ran into legal and 
institutional difficulties in several Member States, notably with 
regard to the transfer to the Fund of a proportion of the go 1 d and 
foreign currency reserves held by certain central banks. An amendment 
to the Treaties, ratified by national parliaments, would overcome this 
difficulty by virtue of the principle of the superiority of 
international law over national law. 
The second reason is that the Single Act stipulates quite explicitly 
(Article 102a(2)) that any institutional changes in the field of 
monetary integration may only be made in accordance with the provisions 
of Article 236 of the Treaty. 
Finally, and most importantly, the establishment of a monetary union 
implies much more significant transfers of sovereignty than those 
entailed by the introduction of the EMS. 
The European Monetary Cooperation Fund ( EMCF) had neither the powers 
nor the responsibilities of the central banks, particularly as the 
latter kept it in an embryonic state. A simple revamping of the EMCF, 
or even a widening of its powers, would not be adequate to secure a 
monetary union pushed to its logical conclusion, i.e. using a single 
currency. 
Monetary union must have a solid legal basis in the Community legal 
order and be backed by guarantees, particularly judicial ones, which 
ensure that commitments entered into are in fact met. 1 The EMS is not 
the result of an amendment to the Treaties but of a European Council 
resolution and an agreement among central banks which do not all 
interpret it in the same way, even assuming they belong to the system. 
This hybrid, controversial system cannot serve as a basis for European 
monetary union. 
The Treaty of Rome did not resolve these matters for the very good 
reason that at the time of its signing all Europe was covered by the 
Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates supervised by the 
International Monetary Fund. There was no need to grant the Community 
special monetary powers because these were divided between national 
authorities and the IMF in accordance with agreements which were not 
seriously called into question before 1970. 
Given that the Treaties must be revised, what amendments are needed? 
Is a single article enough, as for the European Investment Bank 
(Article 129); the protocol setting out the Bank's statutes being 
relegated to the annexes? This would be imprudent, because any 
amendment to the annexes would entail use of the very unwieldy 
procedure for the revision of the Treaties (Article 236). For the same 
reason, not everything should be incorporated in the Treaty. We opt for 
the compromise formula of incorporating only the basic provisions (in 
this case 27 articles) in the Treaty, the statutes being laid down by 
Community law. 
1 
"Towards a European system of central banks"; report of the group 
chaired by J.V. Louis, BFU Publications - Brussels - 1989 
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V. MONETARY STABILITY: AN OBJECTIVE OF AND A PRECONDITION FOR MONETARY 
UNION 
National monetary policies, or at least their results, have diverged very 
considerably during the years of economic crisis. It has rapidly become 
cl ear that attempts to stimulate growth and employment by expanding the 
money supply have failed everywhere. Conversely, those countries which 
have succeeded in imposing the discipline of greater monetary stability 
have protected investment, growth and employment more effectively. The 
objective of monetary stability has thus finally secured acceptance among 
most Community governments. Their participation in a strengthened EMS has 
enabled them to move closer to this objective. 
In order to win broad acceptance, the concept of monetary union must both 
allay the fears of those in countries with strong currencies concerned that 
their purchasing power may be undermined and fulfil the hopes of those in 
countries with weak currencies anxious that this weakness should become a 
thing of the past. The Germans and the Dutch wi 11 on 1 y accept the ECU if 
it as solid as the mark or guilder. The other European countries will only 
accept the discipline imposed by a common currency (i.e. the transfers of 
national sovereignty which flow from it) if the economic benefits appear 
substantial. In other words, monetary stability must quickly convince the 
public that it offers better guarantees of economic and social progress 
(including job creation) than other measures which lead to budgetary 
laxity. In the light of the experience of the last 15 years, this should 
fairly quickly become obvious to all. 
VI. BENEFITS OF MONETARY UNION 
Setting aside the concerns of some and the hopes of others, it must be 
shown to everyone's satisfaction that monetary union offers much greater 
benefits than the current system, even in improved form. 
The DELORS report did not take due account of this eminent 1 y po 1 it i ea 1 
aspect of the problem. 
The Commission therefore decided to remedy this and instructed 
Commission er CHRISTOPHERSEN to submit to Parliament and the Counc i 1 , by 
the end of the first quarter of 1990, a report which to some extent would 
be to monetary union what the CECCHINI report was to the 1992 programme. 
As Parliament will have received this document before the present report is 
adopted, your rapporteur felt there was no need to consider it at length. 
The first benefit of full monetary union is the elimination of all 
transaction costs connected with transfers from one currency to another in 
the Community. Simply taking the value of intra-Community transactions in 
goods and services produces a figure of +I- 600 billion ECU per year for 
the 12 Member States. The cost of one exchange transaction may vary 
between 5% for the tourist and 0.2% for very large-scale commercial 
transactions. Given an average of 0.5%, this produces an annual cost of 
3 bn ECU without counting the cost of capital transactions whose volume is 
much greater than that of commercial transactions. 
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The second less-easily quantifiable, but equally considerable, benefit is 
generated by the reduction in speculative transactions between European 
currencies which seek to exploit interest rate disparities and exchange 
rate fluctuations even when the latter are within the margins acceptable 
under the EMS. 
The third benefit, also difficult to measure, results from the uniformity 
of prices of goods and services throughout the Community, enabling traders 
to profit from rising output, larger markets and the increased mobility of 
labour and capital. The single currency produces greater transparency of 
costs and prices by making them comparable right across the Community, thus 
increasing competition. 
The fourth, microeconomic benefit is the cost reduction resulting from the 
simplification of accounting operations in all firms which keep accounts or 
conduct transactions in several currencies. In the case of firms operating 
throughout the Community, these costs represent not much less than 1% of 
their overall administrative expenditure. 
The most significant benefit of all results from the removal of the major 
constraints on economic policy imposed by the need for governments to 
maintain balance of payments, price and exchange rate stability. 
Because of the increasing interdependence of nation a 1 economies in the 
Community and the full 1 iberal ization of capital movements, the economic 
policy instruments which Member States can still use to maintain these 
macro-economic balances have either become largely ineffective (interest 
rates) or raise awkward political problems (taxation, budget). 
Governments will be forced to make excessive use of interest rate 
increases to prop up exchange rates. They wi 11 have to put a brake on 
growth, consumption and sometimes even investment. 
Monetary union wi 11 not make these constraints disappear as if by magic. 
They will be shifted to Community level where they can be coped with much 
more easily by virtue of economies of scale and mutual economic benefits. 
Community exports account for 14% of its GNP, whereas national exports make 
up more than 35% of national GNPs. Thus, the foreign trade surplus of the 
FRG and the Benelux countries vis-a-vis third countries alone covers the 
deficits of the other Member States vis-a-vis those same countries. 
Equally, monetary union would not make trade deficits between Member States 
disappear, but they would be corrected or financed by the free play of 
market forces whose constraints are more politically acceptable to the 
Member States than instructions emanating from a Community authority, even 
supposing that such an authority could issue instructions and enforce them. 
Finally, the last in the list of the benefits of monetary union would 
derive from the ECU's elevation to the status of an international reserve 
currency potentially more solid than the dollar. The Community is a much 
more abundant source of savings than the United States. Its share of world 
trade and its currency reserves considerably exceed those of the United 
States. With the ECU becoming a reserve and trading currency more stable 
than the dollar, European importers and exporters could invoice a growing 
proportion of their transactions in ECU, thus reducing proportionately the 
exchange rate risks which they currently accept or are forced to cover in 
transactions denominated in dollars. The drawbacks to a country of its 
currency becoming a reserve currency (less control over internal stability) 
are more easily withstood the larger that country is. The establishment of 
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an ECU area parallel to and as large as (it would rapidly take in the EFTA 
countri es 1 and, in the near future, the countries of Eastern Europe) the 
dollar and yen areas would greatly facilitate attempts to use international 
monetary policy instruments to stimulate the economy or, at the very least, 




The sum of all these benefits of European monetary union on which we have 
not put a figure but which the Commission has sought to assess 2 seem to us 
to far outweigh the drawbacks resulting from restrictions on national 
monetary sovereignty, which has already been considerably eroded. 
These drawbacks are at their worst in the transitional period during which 
economic po 1 icy convergence must maintain fixed exchange rates. However, 
the benefits of monetary union are optimized once the single-currency stage 
is reached. That is why, contrary to what the DELORS report implies, it is 
vital to cut the transitional period to a minimum and make, as quickly as 
possible, the amendments to the Treaty which are set out in detail in this 
report. 
VII. MONETARY STABILITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF THE CENTRAL BANK 
Monetary union cannot take shape or survive without monetary stabi 1 i ty. 
How can this be secured? 
Impart i a 1 observation 1 eads to the conclusion that those countries with 
the greatest degree of sustained monetary stabi 1 i ty have been those in 
which the central bank has been least hemmed in by central government 
orders (FRG, Austria, Switzerland and USA) or in which governments have 
refrained from giving such orders (Netherlands, Japan and Taiwan). 
Only an independent institution is capable of resisting the classic 
political temptations of assigning to monetary policy objectives as 
laudable as the stimulation of growth and employment and the reduction of 
regional or social disparities when, in fact, the instruments best suited 
to attaining these objectives are fiscal or budgetary and, therefore, much 
more difficult to handle and less popular. 
Monetary policy instruments are much less painful in their impact, more 
discreet, more diffuse. The policy of expanding the money supply acts a 
little like a drug, but the initial euphoria quickly gives way to 
agonizing withdrawal symptoms. 
Secondly, for reasons of efficiency, a modern central bank system must not 
be dependent on the instructions given by national governments or 
Community i nst it uti ons. The lengthy concertation, consultation or 
conciliation procedures generally employed in these institutions are 
1 Switzerland and Austria are already part of the German mark area. 
2 cf. the statement to Parliament by Mr Delors, President of the Commission, 
on 25 October 1989 
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completely incompatible with the rapid, flexible action needed to 
influence exchange rate and money market trends. 
Moreover, measures targeted on interest rates or the money supply only 
have repercussions on economic activity several months or several quarters 
later. The timing of the measures is just as important as their nature, 
and should not be affected by short-term variables, electoral ambitions or 
media pressure. 
The independence of the central bank is not in itself enough to ensure 
monetary stability because inflation is not determined solely by the 
volume of money in circulation. The government, businessmen, the two 
sides of industry and the public in general can, by their actions, nullify 
the measures taken by the central bank. A propensity to indebtedness or 
speculation, wage settlements which pay no heed to productivity, the 
freedom of certain monopolies to determine prices and the indexation of 
earned and unearned income may all fuel inflation, even if no new money is 
being printed. However, all these phenomena can be that much more easily 
monitored and controlled if everyone involved in the economy is aware of 
the firm and rigorous attitude of an independent central bank which 
attaches priority to protecting monetary stability. 
The independence of the central bank is even more necessary in the 
Community than in a Member State. 
There are two reasons for this. A common monetary policy must not appear 
to favour one Member State more than another or be influenced more by one 
than another. 
Secondly, in a federation of states the po lit i ea l tendency is to secure 
half-baked compromises by meeting half-way, whereas in monetary matters it 
is rigour, clarity and speed of action which count. 
It is no coincidence that the federal states most frequently cited as 
examples (FRG, USA, Switzerland and Canada) have the most independent 
central banks. 
At all events, two or three Member States will not accept the idea of 
European Monetary Union if it is not supervised by a highly independent 
central bank whose priority objective is a solid, stable currency. 
VIII. HOW CAN THE AUTONOMY OF A CENTRAL BANK SYSTEM BE ENSURED? 
Autonomy does not imply absolute independence. It rather implies the 
decision-making powers and freedom of action needed to achieve the 
monetary policy objectives laid down by government. 
It implies, at the very least, the exclusive prerogative to print money 
and the power to use, without hindrance or prior authorization, all the 
instruments now at the disposal of large, modern central banks to 
influence the most sophisticated money and financial markets, even if some 
are not currently used in all the Member States. 
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This autonomy does not rule out consultation and cooperation with 
Community institutions and national authorities. It even carries with it a 
duty to 1 end active support to the a eh i evement of the genera 1 economic 
policy objectives laid down by the Community's political institutions 
(Commission, Council and Parliament). 
However, these considerable and stri ctl y-defi ned 
subject to governmental authority at Community or 
matched, in a democratic society, by public 
independent watchdog system. 
powers, wh i eh cannot be 
national level, must be 
accountability and an 
Autonomy cannot be enacted. Even the most authoritative text can, in 
practice, go unheeded. Autonomy is bu i 1 t up and won, and there is no 
universal formula to guarantee it. It will normally flow from a series of 
mechanisms and procedures based on clearly defined powers and 
res pons i bil it i es. However, much wi 11 depend on the qua 1 i ty of the men 
chosen to bear these responsibilities and on their independence. The 
latter can be ensured by offering officials a relatively long term of 
office (eight years at the Bundesbank, 14 years at the Federal Reserve), 
by financial arrangements whi eh make them secure during and after their 
term of office, by a so 1 emn commitment under oath of independence, by 
laying down certain incompatibilities, etc. 
Quality cannot be guaranteed so easily. The criteria of competence, 
experience and distinguished achievement should considerably outweigh 
those, unfortunately more commonly applied, of nationality and political 
persuasion, particularly as European monetary policy will be indivisible. 
A stable and sol id currency is as much a good thing for Portugal as for 
Germany. Conversely, inflation always harms the have-nots more than the 
haves. 
The final guarantee of the independence of the European central bank must 
be, in addition to a distinct legal identity, the power to call up 
adequate financial resources and decide freely on their allocation in 
accordance with the banks statutory tasks. Put more clearly, the European 
centra 1 bank must have own resources (i.e. subscribed, non-fixed capita 1 
and current income from its investment operations) which enable it to meet 
all its needs without having to beg funds. 
The bank's board must also have considerable internal management powers, 
including over it's staff. Most central banks already enjoy such powers 
and the European Central Bank should be similarly equipped. 
IX. INDEPENDENCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
In a democracy, those on whom powers are conferred must account for their 
action. 'No autonomy without accountabi 1 i ty or accountabi 1 i ty without 
1 egit imacy. ' 1 
The central bank in a federal state must have a double legitimacy, granted 
by the people and the states in the federation. The procedure which best 
provides this in our Community legal order is that which requires the 
1 I bid, p. 28 
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agreement of the Council and Parliament to a Commission proposal. This is 
the procedure we suggest in Article 3(2). 
The principle of central bank autonomy must be combined, in a delicate 
balance, with the principles of coherence in the conduct of policies and 
democratic supervision. This balance rules out direct political control 
of the banks' actions in the form of instructions, orders or prior 
authorizations or indeed the veto, the i nva 1 i dation of decisions or the 
replacement of officials. The proposed system is based on active 
cooperation among the institutions giving rise to close relations with the 
Commission which may participate in the bank's discussions without having 
the right to vote. 
The Council, in cooperation with Parliament, will lay down economic policy 
guidelines and enact the necessary Community legislation. It will also 
appoint the senior offici a 1 s in consultation with the other i nst it uti ons 
(cf. Article 10). The fact that Parliament is involved in appointing the 
bank's senior officials and that the Governor must give an account of his 
management to Parliament's committee responsible will elicit a host of 
objections from the Council, which will no doubt point out that such rights 
are not granted even to national parliaments. 
The experience of the United States shows that the special 1 inks forged 
between the Federal Reserve and Congress have helped to ensure the 
former's independence from the President and his Administration. In the 
Community, Parliament, along with the Court of Justice, seems to be the 
institution best suited to acting as a counterweight to purely national 
interests. Given that the bank must remain independent of the government, 
it is logical that its public accountability can only be examined by the 
representatives of the citizens of the Community. 
X. THE CENTRAL BANK: A SYSTEM OF CENTRAL BANKS OR THE APPLICATION OF THE 
SUBSIDIARITY PRINCIPLE TO THE MONETARY SPHERE 
A unifying and centralizing approach would imply the merger of national 
central banks, an almost inconceivable1 , but above all, pointless. 
The experience of the United States and the FRG shows that a central bank 
can delegate tasks to national central banks given suitable coordination 
and monitoring mechanisms. 
The central structure may be very compact on condition that it is strong, 
i.e. independent and with the widest possible authority in its particular 
area. 
Monetary policy is not and cannot be regionalized. It can only be 
integrated and must therefore be framed by a single authority. 
Should, for example, the task of intervening on foreign markets be 
restricted to one single national bank, as was the case in the USA? This 
is not necessary if the interventions are precisely coordinated by the 
1 Such a merger would involve more than 100 000 employees. The resulting 
behemoth would be difficult to manage. 
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central bank. Given the advances in data-processing and the 
universalization .of financial markets, this matter no longer raises the 
problems it did only a few years ago. 
With regard to the banks other tasks, such as bank supervision, the 
organization of financial markets or loans to governments, the application 
of the subsidiarity principle will leave national banks with a very 
considerable role to play. 
XI. STAGGERED MONETARY INTEGRATION OR A TWO-SPEED MONETARY EUROPE 
In a single-currency monetary union, an integrated, i.e. non-;-regional ized 
monetary policy must be pursued. 
However, national economies still differ so widely that the staggered 
implementation of economic policy measures remains essential or, indeed, 
inevitable, even in the credit sphere. 
This staggering will be a 11 the more readily accept ab 1 e, without 
undermining the overall Community economy, because it will be one element 
in a monetary union consolidated at institutional level; the experience of 
federal states testifies to this. 
However, it is quite understandable that when faced with such a 
significant change certain Member States, feeling that their economies are 
not ready, should express reservations and drag their feet so much as to 
stall a process acknowledged as essential and beneficial to everyone. 
Staggering the implementation of the system, both chronologically and 
geographically, could take account of these special interests. 
The possible delay in certain Member States joining the European system of 
central banks should not, in principle, pose many more problems than the 
current non-participation of certain central banks in the EMS exchange rate 
mechanism. 
The sole concession should be that during the transitional period, which 
should be kept as short as possible, only the central bank governors of 
the countries participating fully in monetary union may take part in votes 
in the bank's Governing Council. This should also apply in.the Council and 
European Council when these bodies have to rule on monetary matters or 
economic matters directly connected with monetary union. 
These provisions need not apply to the Commission and Parliament, since 
the Commissioners are independent of their governments 1 and MEPs sit as 
members of political groups which are supposed to represent the interests 
of all Community citizens. 
In addition, 'the Bank may exercise its powers as it sees fit in 
accordance with the needs which emerge in particular Member States.' 2 
1 At least they give a solemn oath to that effect, pursuant to Article 157 
of the Treaty. 
2 Op. cit. p. 37 
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Articles 6 and 7 of Chapter II of the statutes empower the Bank, in 
accordance with its decision-making and monitoring procedures, to take any 
measure it deems appropriate without necessarily applying them to all the 
Member States. It may also delegate certain of its tasks to specific 
national central banks pursuant to Article 8. 
* 
* * 
Despite this flexibility and considerable latitude, it cannot be ruled out 
that a Member State in which the subject has provoked an excessively 
heated debate might refuse to participate in monetary union. 
As referred to under point I, Parliament had already touched on this 
problem in connection with its draft Treaty establishing the European 
Union. Article 82 of the draft Treaty stipulates that once it has been 
ratified by a majority of the Member States whose population represents 
two-thirds of the total population of the Communities those Member States 
may put the Treaty into force, at the same time making arrangements to 
govern relations with those Member States which have not ratified it. 
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states that treaties may be 
revised by common accord of the signatory states, these revisions applying 
only to those states which are party to them, in accordance with the 
principle of the relative effect of conventions (Article 30). This implies 
that they must not all be parties to revisions. 
This situation arose before when the six founding Member States of the 
ECSC and, later, the EEC, all signatories to the Treaty establishing the 
Council of Europe, decided to go further along the path of European 
integration than some of the other signatories to this same Treaty were 
prepared to venture. 
Parliament's views on this matter have never varied, as illustrated by 
many resolutions, including those of: 
- 17 April 1985, OJ No. C 122, 22.5.1985, p. 90, 
- 9 July 1985, OJ No. C 229, 9.9.1985, p. 29, 
- 17 June 1987, OJ No. C 190, 20.7.1987, p. 71, 
- 14 April 1989, OJ No. C 120, 16.5.1989, p. 331, -and 
- 25 October 1989. 
It goes without saying, in this scheme of things, that not only would the 
present Treaty have to be amended but a new 'Treaty establishing economic 
and monetary Union' would have to be signed. A protocol annexed to this 
new treaty would determine the relationship between the minority states and 
the institutions of the monetary Union. 
XII. THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE TRANSITIONAL PHASE 
In a spirit of pragmatism, Parliament accepts the idea of phasing-in 
monetary Union and, therefore, of making provision for a transitional 
phase. 
DOC_EN\D0\95406 
- 29 - PE 140.147/fin./B 
Or. Fr. 
The full liberalization of capital markets in July 1990 will require a 
considerable strengthening of the EMS1 and, above all, greater convergence 
in economic and monetary policy. Parliament diverges from the DELORS 
report in taking the view that these two requirements are more important 
for the completion of the first phase of monetary Union than the 
participation of all the currencies in the European system of central 
banks. This is desirable, naturally, and should be made possible at a 
moment's notice later, but it cannot be made a precondition if one wishes 
to prevent a single Member State ho 1 d i ng a 11 the others to ransom. One 
should also not underestimate the incentive which the smooth running of a 
monetary Union accepted by the majority might offer reluctant or 
recalcitrant Member States. 
The second phase would begin with the rat i fi cation of monetary Union and 
the simultaneous establishment of the European system of central banks. 
From its inception, the European Central Bank (ECB) would supersede the 
EMCF and take over its role. It could perform, from the beginning, the 
bank supervision tasks which the advances in Community legislation in this 
field would necessitate. It would also immediately take over the 
essential tasks connected with the Community's external monetary and 
financial relations. It could already issue ECUs against both reserve 
currencies (which the EMCF already does) but also against national 
currencies. 
It would also take responsibility for intervening on foreign exchange 
markets in the Community, coordinating such actions with national banks. 
It would have the task of managing the currency reserves deposited with it 
by national banks in return for ECUs issued to them. 
The third phase, which should start no more than two years after the 
beginning of the second phase (for all the reasons set out in points II 
and VI), would first see the introduction of permanently fixed exchange 
rates and, in conjunction with this, the issue of a single currency which 
would be legal tender throughout the monetary Union. Community 
legislation would set the deadline for the withdrawal of national 
currencies from circulation. 
The ECB would have, from the start of the third phase, exclusive 
responsibility for issuing and safeguarding the value of the European 
monetary unit (in all likelihood the ECU) which would be defined in its 
own right rather than, as in today's EMS, by reference to the basket of 
currencies. 
XIII. THE COMMUNITY'S EXTERNAL MONETARY POLICY 
1 
The substance of a po 1 icy, wh i eh by definition is subject to change and 
adjustment, is not usually enshrined in a constitutional requirement. The 
constitution - for us the Treaties - normally confines itself to setting a 
general goal for a policy and laying down the instruments, powers and 
For the pract i ea 1 measures to strengthen the EMS, see the HERMAN report 
on the consolidation and completion of the EMS (Doe. 1-1251/83), which is 
still highly topical. 
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responsibilities of the authorities responsible for qevising and 
implementing that policy. 
In the case in point, Articles 1 and 4, particul.arly in their new wordi~g, 
specify that it is the ESCB which is responsible for the Community's 
external monetary policy, the aim of which is the internal stability of 
the currency and that this po 1 icy of stabi 1 i ty forms an integra 1 part of 
the economic and social policy defined by the Council and Parliament. 
The question as to who decides to modify the exchange rate parity of the 
ECU in relation to third currencies does not arise in a system of 
fluctuating exchange rates such as we are familiar with today. 
It would be a different matter if the international monetary system were 
to evolve in the direction of a return to fixed parities. In that 
eventuality, we would be faced with applying Article 2 which specifies 
that the internal and external arrangements for the ECU are determined by 
the Council on a proposa 1 from the Commission and with the assent of 
Parliament. 
The specific powers under which the Central Bank may intervene on exchange 
markets and implement its external monetary policy are laid down in 
Articles 4, second paragraph, 5(2), 6 and 8 of the proposed Treaty 
amendments and in Articles 3 to 8 of the draft statutes. 
XIV. PROMOTION OF THE ECU AND MAINTENANCE OF NATIONAL CURRENCIES 
The existing provisions of the EMS allow the central banks, should they so 
wish, to make greater use of the ECU in its intervention role on exchange 
markets and in its role as a means of settlement for transactions between 
central banks. 
Without needing to look too far in the existing prov1s1ons, they could 
even agree to p 1 ay the ro 1 e of 1 ender of 1 ast resort in the system of 
compensation for private ECU transactions devised by the private banks 
with the cooperation of the BIS. 
There is no doubt that the Community institutions, more p-articularly the 
Commission and Parliament, could make much greater use of the ECU than 
today as a means of payment in implementing their budgets. 
Making widespread use of the ECU as a means of payment in all intra-
Community transactions would have a favourable impact not only on the 
prohibitive cost of transactions imposed by the banks today but, above 
all, on the political acceptability of monetary union among increasingly 
wide sections of the general public. 
When the Community, in accordance with the requirements of Article 16, 
decides to move on to the stage of fixing parities irreversibly, the ECU 
will cease to be a basket currency and will become an autonomous currency 
the value of which will no longer depend on that of its components but on 
the monetary policy which the ESCB manages to pursue. The national 
currencies without disappearing physically will continue in circulation 
for a while but will henceforth represent only a fraction or a multiple of 
the ECU. Since this ratio will remain unchanged and will not involve any 
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exchange risk, it is to be hoped that the banks will be able to transact 
exchange operations between the ECU and national currencies at truly 
minimal cost. Should this not be the case, the ECB could require them to 
do so free of charge once the ECU had been recognized as 1 ega 1 tender 
throughout the Community. 
A gentle transition of this kind should help alleviate the worries of 
those who believe that the general public will never agree to give up its 
national currency even supposing that national governments ultimately 
accept to do so. As far as the governments are concerned, their surrender 
of sovereignty does not result from the acceptance of a common monetary 
symbol but from the irreversible setting of fixed exchange rates. 
XV. ECONOMIC UNION AND CONVERGENCE 
Several colleagues have expressed regret at the imbalance between the 
provisions relating to monetary union (17 articles) and those relating to 
economic union (5 articles). 
This apparent imbalance results simply from the fact that the Treaty 
already contains a very large number of provisions relating to economic 
union and practically none relating to monetary union. The reason for 
this has been given above (see chapter I-IV-B). 
All the prov1s1ons relating to freedom of movement, 
transport, regional policy and the policies which have been 
these bases as well as the budgetary resources earmarked 
already be used to strengthen the convergence of policies. 
competition, 
deve 1 oped on 
for them can 
The three amendments proposed for strengthening the Community's capacity 
to bring about a greater alignment of economic policies on the part of the 
Member States involve major transfers of power which go far beyond the 
simple powers of recommendation that exist today. 
The relatively large number of provisions devoted to monetary union are 
due to the need to create a new i nst it uti on, the European Centra 1 Bank, 
whilst for economic union the institutions have already existed for 
thirty-three years. 
To those who object that the many existing prov1s1ons have not proved 
their effectiveness in terms of the convergence of economic policy, it 
should be pointed out that implementation of the EMS in addition to the 
common policies has greatly contributed to reducing the divergences 
between Member States in terms of i nfl at ion and growth but that this is 
still inadequate. It is for this reason that we are proposing, in 
Articles 17 to 22, to boost the Community's means of achieving a greater 
degree of convergence. 
We are also aware of the fact that an increase in the Community's 
budgetary resources would be necessary to faci 1 i tate the convergence of 
national economies. Parliament will also have to tackle this issue but 
for the moment it goes beyond the scope of this report. 
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It would however be bad tactics to seek to check monetary integration as 
long as the volume of the Community budget has not grown in relation to 
the Community's gross domestic product. Experience with the EMS has shown 
that the constraints of the system have prompted national governments to 
encourage the convergence of policies and performance. 
This consideration must not prompt us to resist the temptations for 
Parliament to increase the Community budget subject to the proviso, 
however, that the new policies to be financed do respect the principle of 
subsidiarity, that the expenditure thus agreed to at European level is 
more effective than that agreed at national level and, lastly, that such 
increases do not add to the overall tax burden already borne by Community 
citizens. 
Chapter 11. Draft Statutes 
Since it is stipulated that the Bank's statutes will be adopted by the Council 
on a proposal from the Commission and with the assent of Parliament, it would 
be appropriate to await the Commission's proposal. 
Nevertheless, as several of our colleagues have expressed a wish for a 
comprehensive view of the entire European System of Central Banks, please find 
attached by way of documentation a set of draft statutes. 
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The European Central Bank (ECB) set up by Article (3)** of the Treaty 
establishing the European Economic Community, hereinafter called 'the Bank', 
shall be governed by the provisions of this Treaty and these statutes. 
Additionally, the harmonized provisions of commercial company law shall apply 
to the Bank. 
Article 2 
Seat 
The seat of the Bank shall be in ( ..... ). 
The Bank may open branches or representative offices inside or outside the 
Community. 
CHAPTER 2 
TASKS AND ACTIVITIES 
Article 3 
Tasks laid down in the Treaty 
The tasks of the Bank are laid down in Articles (4, 5, 6, 7 and 8) of the 
Treaty. 
Article 4 
Issue of monetary symbols 
The Bank shall issue notes intended to circulate as a means of payment. 
The Bank'may issue coinage intended to circulate as a means of payment. 
The Bank shall conclude the necessary agreements with the institutions of 
issue which are prepared to afford it their assistance in organizing the issue 
and entry into circulation of monetary symbols. 
Article 5 
Issue of public securities 
The Bank shall issue short-dated public securities denominated in ECU. 
** The article numbers shown in brackets in these statutes correspond to 
those in the draft Treaty amending the EEC Treaty drawn up by the Group. 




The Bank may effect all tr~nsactions decided by the Board of Directors with a 
view to the accomplishment of its tasks. 
In particular, the Bank may: 
(a) receive deposits lodged by central banks, credit institutions and other 
bodies; 
(b) hold and manage reserve assets, in particular: 
- the reserve position of the Community with the International Monetary 
Fund (alternative: the collective reserve position of the Member States) 
as well as the special drawing rights allocated to the Community or to 
the Member States; 
- the reserve assets transferred by national monetary authorities; 
(c) buy and sell gold, currencies and other monetary assets; 
(d) discount, rediscount, buy, sell and accept in guarantee all claims as 
we 11 as a 11 bills, securities and bonds issued or guaranteed by the 
Member States or foreign states, the Communities, the European Investment 
Bank or any international organization in which the Community or its 
Member States participate, as long as such assets are readily negotiable 
on the market; 
(e) carry out transfer and payment orders, provide safe custody for securities 
and other assets, effect compensatory settlements and transactions; 
(f) grant advances or participate in swap agreements with central banks, 
credit institutions or other establishments; 
(g) hold shares in international financial organizations; 
(h) grant guarantees of all kinds; 
(i) acquire the premises necessary for the pursuance of its activities. 
The Bank may not: 
Article 7 
Prohibited business 
(a) participate in any direct budget deficit financing operation except for 
the granting of the usual banking facilities to European and national 
institutions in connection with the operation of their current accounts; 
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(possible addition: the Bank may grant the Commission a temporary short-
term advance to finance seasonal deficits. It may grant a similar advance 
to a Member State on request subject to the agreement of the Commission. 
Decisions by the Bank in implementation of this article shall be 
immediately notified to the European Parliament and the Council. 
(b) engage in other business other than on market terms. 
Article 8 
Liquidity and security of assets 
The Bank shall ensure the liquidity and security of its assets. 
Article 9 
Monetary policy measures 
The decisions of a general nature taken by the Bank for the purposes of 
monetary policy may, in particular, require the institutions referred to in 
Article (5(1}} of the Treaty to lodge compulsory monetary reserves with the 
Bank. Such decisions may also include, for a specified period, measures to 
regulate credit involving, in particular, the fixing of minimum or maximum 
interest rates or minimum or maximum ratios between various i terns in their 
accounts. 
CHAPTER 3 
ORGANS OF THE BANK 
Article 10 
Governor 
The Governor shall be responsible for the day-to-day management of the Bank of 
which he is the Chairman. 
He shall represent the Bank in its external dealings. 
He shall chair the Board of Directors, the Bank Council and the Advisory 
Committee. 
In his absence, he shall be replaced by the Deputy Governor. 
Article 11 
Board of Directors 
The Board of Directors shall be responsible for administering and running the 
Bank. It shall take all decisions which are not explicitly reserved for the 
Bank Council under these statutes. 
It shall administer the Bank and shall in particular be responsible for staff 
management. It shall make proposals to the Bank Council. 
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In urgent cases, it shall take the decisions of a general nature provided for 
in Article (8) of the Treaty. It shall report to the Bank Council at its next 
meeting on the decisions taken since the previous meeting. 
The Board of Directors shall act by a majority of the votes cast; in the event 
of a tie, the Chairman shall have a casting vote. 
Article 12 
Bank Counci 1 
The Bank Council shall normally meet each month. 
Its task shall be to exercise general supervision over the Bank's operations; 
it shall deliberate on matters of general concern. 
It shall be responsible for: 
adopting the Bank's internal rules of procedure laying down the operating 
conditions for its organs as well as the internal audit rules; 
fixing the remuneration and pension of members of the Board of Directors; 
approving the staff regulations; 
giving its opinion on proposals to appoint members of the Board of 
Directors; 
except in urgent cases, taking, on a proposal from the Board of Directors 
and subject to the prior opinion of the Commission, the decisions of a 
general nature provided for in Article (7) of the Treaty; 
fixing, on a proposa 1 from the Board of Directors, the genera 1 rules 
guaranteeing the liquidity and security of the Bank's assets; 
determining the amount of annual profits to be shared out and fixing the 
rate of remuneration for reserve assets lodged with the Bank; 
approving the budgets and accounts on a proposal from the Board of 
Directors; 
deliberating on the draft annual report. 
Article 13 
Signing of acts 
All acts engaging the Bank's responsibility shall, 
signed either by the Governor or by another member 
and the secretary of the Bank or by at 1 east two 




in order to be valid, be 
of the Board of Directors 
members of staff to whom 




CAPITAL AND PROFITS 
Article 14 
Capital of the Bank 
The capital of the Bank, which shall initially total (500 million) ECU, shall 
be made up of inalienable shares subscribed as follows: 
half by the Community; 
the other half by the central banks of the Member States for the following 
amounts: 
National Bank of Belgium: (15 million) 
National Bank of Denmark: (10 million) 
Deutsche Bundesbank: (40 million) 
Bank of Greece: (10 million) 
Bank of Spain: (20 million) 
Bank of France: (40 million) 
Central Bank of Ireland: (8 million) 
Bank of Italy: (40 million) 
Luxembourg Monetary Institute: (4 million) 
Netherlands Bank: (15 million) 
Bank of Portugal: (8 million) 
Bank of England: (40 million) 
The capital may be increased by amendment of the statutes. 
Article 15 
Allocation of profit 
An annual levy shall be made on the net profit of the financial year for the 
purposes of financing a reserve fund set up within the Bank. 
The balance of the net profit of the financial year shall be allocated to the 
capital subscribers in proportion to their actual contributions. 
CHAPTER 5 
ANNUAL BUDGETS, ACCOUNTS AND REPORTS 
Article 16 
Reserve fund 
The reserve fund provided for in Article (19) of the Treaty shall be financed 
from an annual levy on profits of at least 20%; this levy shall cease to be 
compulsory once the fund has reached 20% of the capital or any higher amount 
determined by mutual agreement between the Bank and the Commission. 
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The financial year shall run from 1 January to 31 December each year. 
Article 18 
Accounts 
The Bank's annua 1 accounts sha 11 be maintained in accordance with genera 11 y 
accepted accounting pri ne i p 1 es and with the Community rules a pp 1 i cab 1 e to 
commercial companies with regard to structure, content and method of 
assessment. 
The presentation of the Bank's accounts, the various chapter headings and the 
particular methods of assessment shall be approved by the Bank Council which 
may derogate from the general rules to take account of the special nature of 
the Bank's activities. 
The accounts shall be kept in ECU. 
Article 19 
Annual report and accounts 
The annual report shall be drawn up by the Board of Directors after discussion 
by the Bank Council and after the Advisory Committee has delivered its 
op1n1on. It shall be published together with the opinion of the Bank Council 
and, where appropriate, that of the Advisory Committee. 
The annua 1 accounts sha 11 be drawn up on the res pons i bil ity of the Board of 
Directors. They shall be submitted to the Bank Council for approval. They 
shall be published in the Official Journal each March. 
Article 20 
Monthly statement 
A statement of the Bank's assets and 1 i abi 1 it i es i ncl udi ng those entered in 




The Bank's budget of expenditure sha 11 be approved by the Bank Counc i 1 on a 
proposal from the Board of Directors. 
The budget shall be notified to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
Commission, the Court of Auditors and the central banks of the Member States 
before 30 December of the preceding financial year. 




A committee compr1 s 1 ng three persons appointed for their competence by the 
Bank Council shall verify that the Bank's operations and books are in order. 
It shall confirm to the Bank Council that the balance sheet and profit and 
loss account provide a faithful picture of the Bank's assets, financial 
situation and results. 
Its annual report shall be published. 




Succession to the EMCF 
The Bank shall succeed to the European Monetary Cooperation Fund taking over 
all its assets and liabilities. 
Article 24 
Transfer of assets from national reserves 
The Bank Council shall determine the amount and manner of remuneration of 
national reserves transferred to the Bank in implementation of Article (22)(2) 
of the Treaty. 
Article 25 
Management of the European Monetary System 
The Bank shall intervene and provide financing as appropriate in order to 
maintain the stability of exchange rates within the European Monetary System. 
Article 26 
Progressive attainment of monetary union 
Having regard to the principle of subsidiarity and the stage reached in the 
attainment of monetary integration, the Bank Council shall adopt the necessary 
coordinating provisions to allow the Bank to exercise progressively its full 
powers. 
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The Bank shall issue ECUs in exchange for the compulsory deposits lodged with 
it by monetary authorities and credit institutions under the conditions which 
it shall lay down. 
The Bank shall exchange currency holdings for ECUs under the conditions which 
it shall lay down. 
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OPINION 
(Rule 120 of the Rules of Procedure) 
of the Committee on Budgets 
Draftsman: Mr COLOM I NAVAL 
At its meeting of 27 June 1990 the Committee on Budgets appointed Mr COLOM I 
NAVAL draftsman. 
At its meeting of 9 July 1990 the Committee considered the draft opinion and 
unanimously adopted the conclusions. 
The following took part in the vote: von der VRING (Chairman), CORNELISSEN 
(2nd Vice-Chairman), COLOM I NAVAL (draftsman), ARBELOA MURU, ARIAS CARETE, 
BOGE, COCHET, ELLES, GOEDMAKERS, KELLETT-BOWMAN, LAMASSOURE, LANGES, LO 
GIUDICE, MIRANDA DA SILVA, NAPOLETANO (for COLAJANNI), PASTY, RBNN (for 
PAPOUTSIS), SAMLAND, SIMONS (for COT), THEATO, TOMLINSON, VAN PUTTEN (for 
DESAMA), WYNN and ZAVVOS. 
DOC_EN\D0\95406 - 42 - PE 140.147/fin./B 
Or. Fr. 
1. At present, with the intergovernmental conferences on Economic and 
Monetary Union and Political Union to be convened in December of this year, 
the guiding principle behind the Committee on Budgets' opinions and proposals 
must be to point to the main factors and criteria to be borne in mind with a 
view to far-reaching reform of the Treaties as regards the committee's 
responsibilities, i.e. Community finance. 
2. With regard to Economic and Monetary Union, the draft report of the 
Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and Industrial Policy follows this 
very 1 i ne and even suggests a complete text of the EEC Treaty modified as 
regards monetary union and, more specifically, the status of a future European 
Central Bank. 
3. However, we believe that economic union could be developed further, since 
the legislative proposals contained in this report play down the role of the 
Community budget both in terms of its adjustment - and corresponding increase 
in size- to cover a broader range of Community responsibilities, and in terms 
of its possible and indeed desirable use as an active instrument of financial 
policy. 
4. If it is clear now that the Community's financial system must be reformed 
to bring it into line with the requirements of a single market, as envisaged 
when the 1993 target was set at the beginning of 1988, Economic and Monetary 
Union, which entails more extensive and more complex integration, will require 
a Community-wide financial system which goes far beyond merely pooling the 
necessary resources to implement a set of basic policies and plays a leading 
role in shaping an active financial policy in monetary and fiscal terms, 
coordinated with the various sources of Community finance through what is 
being described as a 'financial constitution'. 
5. As the report recognizes, Economic and Monetary Union will require firm 
coordination of the financial policies of the Member States, just as federal 
or regional states currently divide, vertically and horizontally, the powers 
and responsibilities for public finance so that coherent fiscal policies can 
be put into effect at national level. Coordination of monetary policies is 
essential and must go hand in hand with at least a similar level of fiscal 
policy coordination. If, in addition to its current role as a source of 
finance for basic policies, the Community budget acquires the role of 
coordinating 'partial' financial policies, a radical change in the power 
system which shapes the budget will have to be introduced. 
6. However, as regards the Community budget, the proposed amendment to 
Articles 103 to 105 of the EEC Treaty implicitly preserves the classic and 
obsolete idea of budgetary balance. The convergence of economic policies 
whi eh is advocated is at odds with the fact that the Community budget is 
virtually incapable of playing a stabilizing role and is confined to other 
objectives such as redistribution and, to a lesser extent, effective 
allocation of resources. 
7. It seems to us that, quite apart from other considerations, this idea will 
play down the democratic deficit of which the European Parliament is a victim 
and which it has been constantly criticizing as much as or more than the 
inevitable relative increase in Community funds once economic union is 
achieved. 
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8. On another front, it must be noted that no attempt is made to uphold the 
powers of political control of the European Parliament over the operations of 
the future Central Bank. This bank will obviously require considerable 
autonomy as the driving force behind monetary union and will therefore be 
largely independent of the Community's budgetary authority, but this does not 
mean that it should be exempt from all ex-post control. 
Conclusions 
9. Economic and Monetary Union cannot be achieved without a positive increase 
in the Community's democratic legitimacy, especially as regards the 
European Parliament's powers and, in particular, for a variety of reasons, 
its budgetary powers. 
10. The completion of Economic and Monetary Union will mean that the 
financial provisions of the Treaties will no longer be adequate and will 
therefore need overall revision based on a greater balance between the two 
arms of the budgetary authority and the principles of budget universality 
and full fi nanc i a 1 se 1 f-suffi c i ency and independence for the Community, 
and will have to incorporate a sufficient basis to determine the nature 
and amount of budget expenditure and revenue, including the possibility 
of imposing Community taxes. 
11. In these conditions, the Community budget will no longer be a passive 
method of financing basic policies but will combine its redistributive 
role and its contribution to allocation efficiency with an active role in 
planning and coordinating stabilizing policies. 
12. With regard to the European Central Bank, its broad degree of 
independence and the special budgetary status it will therefore enjoy do 
not exempt it from subordination to political control by Parliament. 
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